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Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin 
Pekka Väyrynen  
Abstract: The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ value concepts, and its importance to 
ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three 
claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts. (1) Analogy 
with ethics offers no straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick 
and thin epistemic concepts. (2) Assuming there is such a distinction, there are no semantic 
grounds for assigning thick epistemic concepts priority over the thin. (3) Nor does the 
structure of substantive epistemological theory establish that thick epistemic concepts enjoy 
systematic theoretical priority over the thin. In sum, a good case has yet to be made for any 
radical theoretical turn to thicker epistemology. 
1. Introduction 
The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ evaluative and normative 
concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic 
in recent meta-ethics. That debate has a reputation for obscurity which 
isn’t, I think, wholly unearned. But that needn’t be an obstacle in 
determining whether a similar distinction can be drawn between thick 
and thin epistemic concepts and what kind of importance such a 
distinction might have to epistemology. 
This paper concerns meta-epistemology. It defends three claims 
concerning thick and thin epistemic concepts. There is no 
straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick 
and thin epistemic concepts on the basis of an analogy with thick and 
thin concepts in ethics (§2). Assuming there is such a distinction, its 
importance to epistemology cannot be established on semantic 
grounds; there is no semantic case for treating thick epistemic concepts 
as prior to the thin or otherwise taking a turn to a thicker epistemology 
(§3). Considerations regarding the structure of substantive 
epistemological theory also don’t establish that thick epistemic 
concepts enjoy systematic theoretical priority over the thin (§4). A good 
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case has yet to be made for a radical theoretical turn to thicker 
epistemology. 
2. The Thick and the Thin in Ethics and Epistemology 
Discussions of thick and thin concepts in ethics almost invariably begin 
with examples. Typical examples of thick evaluative or normative 
concepts include CRUELTY, BRUTALITY, EXPLOITATION, DECEITFULNESS, 
GENEROSITY, and GRATITUDE.1 Typical examples of thin concepts are 
those expressed by many occurrences of words like ‘good,’ ‘wrong,’ and 
‘ought.’2  
But, moving beyond examples, it is hard to find an adequate 
account of what makes an evaluative concept count as thick and 
distinguishes these from concepts that are thin in some relevant 
contrasting sense. In an influential discussion, Bernard Williams says 
that thick concepts express a ‘union of fact and value’ in that their 
applicability is both ‘action-guiding’ (it at least typically indicates the 
presence of reasons for action) and ‘world-guided’ (it depends on how 
the world is in certain non-evaluative respects).3 It has become 
common to say that a term stands for a thick value concept if it 
expresses an evaluative concept with significant non-evaluative content, 
and that thick value concepts differ from the thin at least in the way 
they seem to combine description and evaluation as a matter of their 
meaning. It might be thought, for instance, that even if causing 
gratuitous pain is both cruel and wrong, its wrongness isn’t encoded in 
the very meaning of ‘wrong’ in the way its cruelty is encoded in that of 
‘cruel.’  
                                                     
1 I’ll use small capitals to designate concepts. Words and other linguistic expressions will 
appear in single quotes when they are mentioned. Properties are designated by italics. 
Italics are used also for highlighting.  
2 Since it’ll make no difference to my discussion whether there is some significant 
distinction between the evaluative and the normative, I’ll use ‘evaluative’ to cover both. 
3 See Williams (1985: 128, 140). For some other ways of developing the general idea 
behind Williams's distinction, see e.g., Gibbard (1992), Blackburn (1992), and Dancy 
(1995). 
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The existence of some sort of distinction between thick and thin 
concepts in ethics isn’t in doubt. At least the typical examples of thick 
and thin value concepts seem clearly to differ, along some dimension of 
specificity, with respect to how descriptive they are. So far as their 
meanings go, ‘cruel’ and ‘deceitful’ seem to have richer non-evaluative 
meaning, and their applicability more robustly world-guided, than 
‘wrong’ or ‘bad.’ This much fits the observation that the standard way to 
draw the distinction between thick and thin value concepts marks a 
difference in degree (of non-evaluative information encoded in the 
concept) rather than in kind (cf. Scheffler 1987: 417-18). But what 
remains unclear is how to draw a theoretically significant but more or 
less neutral distinction between thick and thin evaluative concepts.4 
It is equally unclear how to distinguish between thick and thin 
epistemic concepts on the basis of an analogy with thick and thin 
concepts in ethics. The idea that thick value concepts have significant 
non-evaluative content whereas thin value concepts have no, or not 
much, significant non-evaluative content could be applied to epistemic 
concepts in two different ways.  
One option is to take a direct analogy with the case of ethics and 
distinguish between thick and thin epistemic concepts in terms of the 
same distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative content. On this 
view both thick and thin epistemic concepts are evaluative concepts, 
distinguished by whether or not they have significant non-evaluative 
content.  
The other option is to take a structural analogy with the case of 
ethics and distinguish between thick and thin epistemic concepts in 
terms of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic content. On 
this view thick epistemic concepts have some significant non-epistemic 
content and thin epistemic concepts have no, or not much, such 
content.  
                                                     
4 Eklund (MS) argues that several existing accounts of the thick-thin distinction are 
defective on this score.  
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Neither way of taking the analogy with the case of ethics is clearly 
good. To see this, first consider examples typically used to illustrate a 
distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. Standard ‘thin’ 
epistemic concepts include EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION, RATIONALITY, and 
KNOWLEDGE. Standard ‘thick’ epistemic concepts come in a somewhat 
more varied list, including INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY, GULLIBILITY, and 
the concepts expressed by certain occurrences of ‘conscientious,’ 
‘careless,’ ‘lucky,’ and ‘trustworthy.’ The existence of some sort of 
distinction between these groups of concepts isn’t in doubt. It also seems 
plausible that in the case of epistemology, too, a distinction between the 
thick and the thin marks a continuum rather than a binary distinction. 
Just as concepts like JUSTICE, IMPARTIALITY, EQUALITY, RIGHTS, 
AUTONOMY, and INTERESTS fit no more obviously with GOOD or RIGHT 
than with BRUTALITY or KINDNESS, so concepts like DECEIVING, 
PROPORTIONED TO EVIDENCE, INDUCTIVE SUPPORT, SIMPLICITY, 
COHERENCE, INSIGHT, and EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY fit no more 
obviously with JUSTIFICATION or KNOWLEDGE than with INTELLECTUAL 
CAUTION or GULLIBILITY. 
The direct analogy presupposes that all epistemic terms are evaluative. 
Its whole point is to distinguish thick epistemic concepts from the thin on 
the basis of whether they have some significant non-evaluative content in 
addition to evaluative content. But, even if some epistemic terms are 
evaluative, it is a substantive and controversial issue whether all are. For 
instance, whether epistemic concepts are normative is a central issue in 
debates over naturalized epistemology sparked by W.V.O. Quine (1969). 
The point can also be raised just with examples.  
One type of example is that calling someone ‘quick to jump to 
conclusions’ or ‘intellectually biased’ often conveys some kind of negative 
evaluation of the person or their belief-formation. But, since words 
which aren’t as a matter of their meaning evaluative can still be used to 
communicate evaluations in contexts with suitable common grounds, this 
negative evaluative content might be merely pragmatically implicated or 
conveyed. Sometimes such negative evaluation might also not be 
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appropriate. Some hold that it can be epistemically appropriate for some 
beliefs to be influenced by certain intellectual biases or heuristics when 
beliefs formed in these ways tend in fact to be reliable.5 
Another type of example is that various concepts of reliability often 
occupy an important role in epistemology, but don’t seem to be 
evaluative. All these concepts concern some or other sort of probabilistic 
connection to truth, but neither TRUTH nor PROBABILITY is, itself, an 
evaluative or normative concept. What makes it true that smoke raises 
the probability of fire, for example, are the worldly nomological 
connections between the presence of the one and the presence of the 
other, not anything normative.  
Thus the direct analogy from ethics to epistemology seems, at present, 
too quick. To further assess this charge, we can consider two ways to resist 
it. One move is to claim that concepts which seem epistemic but non-
evaluative in fact are evaluative. For instance, suppose that jumping 
quickly to conclusions is sometimes but not always epistemically bad. This 
shows that QUICK TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS isn’t an evaluative concept 
only if evaluative concepts cannot license different kinds of evaluation in 
different contexts, such as positive in some but neutral or even negative in 
others. Many discussions of thick concepts in ethics challenge just this 
assumption.6 But its truth or falsity is clearly not to be settled by fiat. Nor 
would its falsity alone establish that concepts like QUICK TO JUMP TO 
CONCLUSIONS really are evaluative concepts after all. So this first move on 
behalf of the direct analogy would go only so far. 
Another move is to claim that concepts which seem epistemic but 
non-evaluative in fact aren’t epistemic. Just as concepts like PLEASURE 
and PAIN, for instance, needn’t be evaluative concepts to figure in moral 
                                                     
5 See e.g., Gigerenzer et al. (2000). Bishop and Trout (2005) argue that epistemic 
excellence doesn’t ban ignoring factors that seem evidentially relevant; using simple 
statistical prediction rules based on a limited number of cues is at least no less efficient and 
reliable. On epistemic shortcuts generally, see Bach (1984).  
6 This assumption is challenged by theorists as different as Blackburn (1992) and Dancy 
(1995). It is a crucial implicit premise in the argument that thick virtue concepts aren’t in 
fact evaluative concepts in Brower (1988).  
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discourse and play a role in ethical theory, so concepts like RELIABILITY 
and QUICK TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS needn’t be epistemic concepts (or 
evaluative concepts, for that matter) to figure in epistemic discourse or 
play a role in epistemology. If they were non-epistemic concepts, then 
they would obviously cut no ice against the direct analogy.  
This second move on behalf of the direct analogy is viable only to the 
extent that there is a good distinction between epistemic and non-
epistemic concepts. Obviously, the same is true of the structural analogy. 
The existence of some sort of distinction isn’t in doubt, since there are 
clear cases of both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts. But notice that 
the present dialectical context requires a distinction which is also neutral 
on the issue whether there is a good distinction between thick and thin 
epistemic concepts. That is precisely the issue at stake. It wouldn’t do to 
say, for instance, that epistemic concepts are those which have some 
significant conceptual connection to knowledge or epistemic 
justification, since KNOWLEDGE and EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION are among 
the paradigm examples of thin epistemic concepts. A dialectically kosher 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic concepts requires a 
basis that falls on neither side of the intuitive distinction between thick 
and thin epistemic concepts. 
But now it has become difficult to see on what basis the requisite kind 
of distinction could be drawn. Numerous unclear cases reinforce the 
worry. For instance, are ‘intellectually cautious,’ ‘trusting,’ ‘discerning,’ 
or ‘hasty,’ as a matter of their meaning, epistemic terms? The answer is 
unclear. These terms seem to have no clear connections to concepts 
which would both suggest classifying them as epistemic and be 
dialectically admissible. Yet they don’t seem clearly non-epistemic either. 
They can be used to describe things like judgments, inferences, and 
habits of belief-formation, which all fall under the subject matter of 
epistemology.  
The structural analogy is thrown into doubt if there is no good basis 
for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic concepts which 
falls on neither side of the intuitive distinction between thick and thin 
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epistemic concepts. The only serious candidate that I can think of, 
TRUTH, is dialectically inadmissible: it would sit ill with those advocates 
of thicker epistemology who think that contemporary epistemology is 
excessively focused on truth.7  
Nor is the direct analogy rescued from doubt. One procedure for 
settling unclear cases is to classify a term as epistemic if we are uncertain 
whether it is epistemic.8 The procedure would count such a varied range 
of concepts as epistemic that it would be implausible that a wide range of 
concepts which seem epistemic but non-evaluative in fact are evaluative 
concepts or that they in fact aren’t epistemic concepts.9 This result would 
render implausible precisely the claims made by our first and second 
defensive moves on behalf of the direct analogy.  
I conclude that it is far from clear that there is a good, clear way to 
distinguish between thick and thin epistemic concepts on the basis of an 
analogy with ethics. The foregoing also gives some evidence that if a 
good, clear distinction is found, it won’t be straightforward. In what 
follows, I won’t try to say more about what would be the best way to 
understand a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. 
More clearly remains to be said on the issue.  
3. How Not to Strike it Thick: the Semantics of Epistemic Terms  
Suppose that a good way to draw a distinction between thick and thin 
epistemic concepts were eventually found, whether by analogy with 
ethics or not. (Again, the existence of some sort of distinction isn’t in 
doubt.) It would still be a further claim that this distinction makes some 
important difference in epistemology. I’ll now argue that its importance 
cannot be established on semantic grounds: there is no systematic 
                                                     
7 See e.g., Elgin (2008). See also §4 below. I’m assuming that TRUTH isn’t an epistemic 
concept. 
8 For an analogous procedure for classifying terms into evaluative and descriptive, see 
Jackson (1998: 120).  
9 My point here is dialectical. I do not mean to rule out the possibility that some terms 
which might seem epistemic (or of whose classification we are uncertain) in fact aren’t, as a 
matter of meaning, epistemic terms.  
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semantic difference between thick and thin epistemic concepts which as 
such makes the distinction important to epistemology. My case is that 
the basic semantic treatment which is appropriate to (most) epistemic 
terms treats terms expressing thick concepts and terms expressing thin 
concepts fundamentally in the same way.  
The semantic treatment I have in mind is the standard sort of formal 
semantics for gradable adjectives, such as ‘tall,’ ‘young,’ and ‘expensive.’ 
Gradable adjectives are well studied in linguistics. Thus, if what we know 
about their semantics is applicable to epistemic terms, then this will 
provide some independent basis for assessing whether the importance of 
a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts can be given a 
semantic basis.  
The class of words which express epistemic concepts is grammatically 
heterogeneous. It includes adjectives, gerund and participle 
constructions, nouns, and verbs: consider ‘gullible’ and ‘coherent,’ 
‘discerning’ and ‘proportioned to evidence,’ ‘justification’ and 
‘intellectual curiosity,’ and ‘trusts’ and ‘knows,’ respectively. This isn’t a 
deep problem for my strategy. Most of these words are gradable or have 
a cognate gradable expression. So most epistemic concepts have 
linguistic expressions with just the syntactic features which are sufficient 
for gradability. First, they admit of comparatives: Things can be more 
rational or better proportioned to evidence than others, or less gullible or 
less epistemically responsible than others. Second, they take on degree 
modifiers like ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’: Things can be quite quick to jump to 
conclusions, somewhat intellectually curious, totally reliable, or very well 
justified.10 So, what we know about gradable expressions seems 
applicable to a wide range of epistemic terms. 
What comparatives do semantically is to establish an ordering 
between two things regarding some common feature that can be enjoyed 
                                                     
10 Most epistemic terms also exhibit a further syntactic feature of gradable expressions: 
they tend to take on certain other modifier phrases, such as ‘for’ and ‘to’ prepositional 
phrases and ‘enough to’ adverbial phrases. Consider ‘reliable for a heuristic,’ ‘too gullible 
to be a detective,’ ‘incoherent enough to be delusional,’ etc. 
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to a greater or lesser extent. The standard semantics for gradable 
adjectives takes them to locate objects on a scale (such as tallness in the 
case of ‘tall’), defined as a set of degrees (or intervals) ordered with 
respect to some property dimension (such as height in the case of ‘tall’).11 So 
the basic semantic value of a gradable adjective is a function from objects 
to values (degrees or intervals) on a scale.12 
The interpretation of the comparative form is simple. (1a) is analyzed 
as (1b-c): 
1a.  Stan is taller than Buster. 
1b.  The value Stan takes on a scale of tallness is greater than the 
value Buster takes on a scale of tallness. 
1c.  tall(Stan) > tall(Buster)13 
An adequate treatment of gradable adjectives must explain how 
comparatives are semantically related to their non-comparative positive 
correlates and capture the context-sensitivity which the latter exhibit in 
many cases. For instance, someone can count as tall relative to a context 
where silent film comedians are under discussion but not tall when 
basketball players are.  
According to the scalar analysis, ‘tall’ can express different properties 
relative to different contexts of utterance because ‘tall’ allows context to 
determine some particular degree value d as the minimal point which an 
object must take on the scale of tallness—the scale along which ‘is taller 
than’ compares objects—to count as satisfying the predicate. So here is 
the positive form: 
                                                     
11 Kennedy (2007) requires that the ordering be a total ordering. But many gradable 
adjectives seem more plausibly linked to partial orderings rather than total orderings. In at 
least some cases the ‘scale’ isn’t linear.  
12 See especially Kennedy (2007) and Glanzberg (2007). For earlier work developing this 
approach, see Cresswell (1977), Klein (1980), and von Stechow (1984). On the use of 
intervals instead of degrees, see Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002). Degrees (and 
intervals) are here understood as abstract representations of measurement.  
13 I will use boldface, like tall, to designate semantic values, interpreted in this case as 
degrees on a scale.  
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2a.  Stan is tall.  
2b. The value Stan takes on a scale of tallness is greater than (or, at 
least as great as) the minimal value d required for counting as 
satisfying ‘tall’ in context c.  
2c. tall(Stan) > d  
The value of d (determined for the adjective by context) is the standard 
for that adjective and context. To count as satisfying ‘tall’ is to meet the 
contextually determined standard for tallness. Degree modifiers can 
then be understood as modifying the required degree value on the 
relevant scale. For instance, ‘very tall’ can be taken to increase the 
required degree of height. 
We already saw syntactic evidence for counting most epistemic 
terms of varying degrees of thickness and thinness as gradable and 
thereby (following standard methodology in linguistics) for treating 
these terms as semantically linked to scales in the way outlined above. 
This latter claim has also some non-syntactic evidence behind it. Many 
examples suggest that whether something counts as satisfying one of 
these terms depends on whether it takes a value on some scale which is 
greater than the minimal value required for counting as satisfying the 
adjective in the context. One can count as epistemically responsible 
relative to a context where epistemic couch potatoes are under 
discussion, but not count as epistemically responsible relative to 
scientific or legal contexts, or gullible relative to members of the 
Skeptical Society but not five-year-olds. And epistemological 
contextualists have argued at length that a belief can count as 
epistemically justified (or as knowledge) relative to a ‘low-stakes’ 
context, but not count as epistemically justified (or as knowledge) 
relative to a ‘high-stakes’ context.14  
                                                     
14 See e.g., Cohen (1999) and DeRose (1999). Note that if the standards for counting as 
satisfying some term vary with context, it doesn’t directly follow that a contextualist 
semantics is correct for the term in question.  
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One might object that this semantics fails to generalize properly 
because some epistemic concepts have no gradable expression. For 
instance, ‘know’ clearly doesn’t behave syntactically like a gradable 
expression.15 This seems to be no mere syntactic fluke. Certain 
expressions which are syntactically similar to ‘know’ behave like gradable 
expressions; consider ‘believe,’ ‘regret,’ or ‘trust.’ But this objection has 
at most limited force.16 Even if not all epistemic concepts have gradable 
expressions, and even if this turns out be epistemologically important, it 
still fails to track a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. 
Many typical examples of thin epistemic terms, such as ‘epistemically 
justified’ and ‘rational,’ are gradable.  
This semantics for epistemic terms doesn’t support the claim that a 
distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts makes an 
important difference to epistemology. Terms that express thick 
epistemic concepts get fundamentally the same semantic treatment as 
terms that express thin ones: both are analyzed along the lines of (1)-(2). 
Just as ‘Maria is intellectually curious’ is true just in case the value Maria 
takes on a scale of intellectual curiosity is greater than the minimal value 
required for counting as satisfying ‘intellectually curious’ in context, so 
‘Jim’s belief that p is epistemically justified’ is true just in case the value 
Jim’s belief takes on a scale of epistemic justification is greater than the 
minimal value required for counting as satisfying ‘epistemically justified’ 
                                                     
15 For an early case, see Dretske (1981: Ch. 5). For a more recent and complete case, see 
Stanley (2004, 2005). 
16 The objection may in fact have no force at all. Since it takes the fact that certain 
epistemic terms don’t behave like gradable expressions to show that the appropriate 
semantics for these terms isn’t scalar, it presupposes that an expression e is semantically 
linked to a scale s only if e is gradable along s. But the scalar analysis requires only that 
epistemic terms have semantic links to scales, not that they behave syntactically like 
gradable expressions. For instance, even if ‘know’ isn’t gradable, it may still be semantically 
linked to a scale of epistemic strength along which knowledge states can be ordered, and 
may still bear some other syntactic marks of semantic links to scales, such as adverbial 
modifiability (see e.g., Blome-Tillman 2008: 43-47). Extending the scalar analysis to ‘know’ 
would require no more. Whether all non-gradable epistemic terms in fact bear syntactic 
marks of semantic links to scales is, of course, an empirical question. But at least all of the 
epistemic terms that are mentioned above are either gradable or adverbially modifiable.  
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in context. Moreover, this semantics doesn’t determine which property 
something enjoys to a certain extent when it counts as satisfying a given 
term, but only requires that there be a property dimension, along which 
objects can be ordered, to be associated with the term in context.17 In 
this respect of their semantics, terms which express epistemic concepts 
are treated the same. If terms that express epistemic concepts get the 
same basic semantic treatment regardless of how thick or thin they are, 
then the importance of a distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts cannot be based on their basic semantics.  
For all this, epistemic terms might still differ semantically in some 
respect other than their formal semantics. For instance, their semantic 
interpretation requires fixing a scale and the values of contextual 
parameters like the standard. These are set by a computation based on a 
wide range of inputs from context.18 So, thick and thin epistemic terms 
might still exhibit some systematic differences—differences that might 
have importance to epistemology—with respect to factors which 
determine the semantic interpretation of the occurrences of these 
terms.19 
To cut a long story short, among the relevant factors only the 
conventional meanings of epistemic terms can hope to exhibit 
                                                     
17 Often the property dimension won’t be as fully determined by the conventional 
meaning of the word as with ‘tall’ (height), ‘young’ (age), and ‘cheap’ (cost). Semanticists 
skirt the issue of what the relevant dimension is. 
18 What contextual factors qualify as inputs, what computational rules must be taken into 
account, and how these must be weighed in semantic interpretation are complex issues 
grouped together as ‘metasemantics.’ For a brief overview of the small amount of 
systematic work done to date on metasemantics, see Glanzberg (2007).  
19 Differences in what the occurrences of one and the same epistemic term express in 
different contexts won’t suffice to make this case. For instance, if the contextualist thesis 
that ‘know’ is context-sensitive is true, then in principle any factor of the relevant kind can 
generate important differences in what relation is expressed by different utterances of 
‘know’; and similarly for contextualism about any other epistemic term. But this is a point 
about different tokens of one and the same epistemic term. It wouldn’t support the claim that 
there are systematic epistemologically important differences between those contextual 
factors which determine the interpretation of pairs of different epistemic terms, such as 
‘intellectually curious’ and ‘epistemically justified.’ 
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systematic semantic differences between them.20 (It is plausible that to 
compute what a sentence expresses in context one should make as 
much use as possible of the conventional meanings of expressions.21) 
Terms like ‘intellectually curious’ and ‘epistemically justified’ seem 
thick to different degrees. And this seems to reflect precisely a 
difference in their conventional meanings, namely in the amount of 
information which they encode concerning the property dimensions of 
their associated scales. If I call someone intellectually curious, then 
competent speakers will take me to have made certain fairly specific 
claims about the cast of her intellectual character. But if I say that some 
belief is epistemically justified, then competent speakers can only take 
me to have made a certain relatively generic claim about the degree of 
epistemic strength enjoyed by the belief, unless they or the context 
supply some further, more specific substantive ideas about what 
epistemic strength is.  
But why think that this sort of difference in the conventional 
meanings of terms like ‘intellectually curious’ and ‘justified’ establishes 
the importance of a distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts to epistemology? It is highly contingent that words have the 
conventional meanings they do. Why should the factors on which 
conventional meaning is contingent, or even the particular factors which 
have made certain epistemic terms thicker than others, be factors which 
generate or even track epistemologically important distinctions?  
No doubt there is no easy answer here. But consider this. Saying that 
someone’s way of forming beliefs is conscientious or careless, for 
                                                     
20 Among other potentially relevant factors, (a) computational rules tend to be 
insufficiently word specific, (b) discourse structure is highly contingent and may be 
determined by non-epistemic or epistemically objectionable factors, and (c) the intentions, 
interests, and other salient properties of speakers and hearers or context which have 
parameter-setting force can seemingly differ systematically between different epistemic 
terms only if the roles of these terms in epistemic discourse already differ in ways one 
would expect their conventional meanings to reflect. This list of factors borrows from 
Kennedy (2007) and Glanzberg (2007). I don’t claim that it is comprehensive. 
21 Kennedy (2007: 36) calls this rule the ‘principle of interpretive economy’ and defends it 
at length.  
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instance, doesn’t impart very specific information about how they form 
their beliefs. They might be conscientious in collecting evidence but 
careless in checking that the samples are representative, or vice versa. 
These claims are similarly indeterminate with respect to many other 
aspects of belief formation. For all that has been shown so far, these 
features of carelessness or conscientiousness might be epistemologically 
important only insofar as they bear on such more general factors as the 
quality of one’s evidence, the reliability of one’s beliefs, or the like. 
Differences in the conventional meanings of epistemic terms of varying 
degrees of thickness, such as the sort of more specific information which 
the conventional meanings of terms like ‘conscientious’ and ‘careless’ 
encode in comparison to terms like ‘justified,’ don’t seem sufficiently 
deep and systematic to establish that a distinction between thick and thin 
epistemic terms as such makes an important difference to epistemology. 
I take this as evidence that the importance of this distinction must be 
established on some other than semantic grounds.  
4. The Thick and the Thin in Substantive Epistemology 
The moral of my story so far is that, assuming the possibility of making 
some good distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts, one 
can establish that it makes a significant difference to epistemology only 
through substantive epistemology. My aim in this final section is to argue 
that the case is yet to be made for anything that could truthfully be 
advertised as a radical turn to thicker epistemology. My strategy is to 
argue that there is no good reason to think that thick epistemic concepts 
enjoy any systematic theoretical priority over the thin. Since the issue 
concerns whether epistemology has a certain general and systematic 
kind of theoretical shape, establishing my conclusion requires only that 
some wide enough range of thick epistemic concepts play no privileged 
theoretical role. If some individual thick concepts play important roles 
fully in their own right, this doesn’t yet establish any systematic priority 
or establish that a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts 
as such is important.  
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One way to defend my claim is to argue that thick and thin epistemic 
concepts are mostly similar in respects which could systematically make a 
substantive difference to epistemology. One such respect is that many 
concepts which play a role in epistemological theory do so only because 
they either are partly defined or explicated in terms of truth or else bear 
some other kind of important connection to truth.22 KNOWLEDGE, 
JUSTIFICATION, and RELIABILITY are often taken to satisfy the former 
condition. GULLIBILITY and REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE, among others, are 
often taken to satisfy the latter. For instance, even many true beliefs of 
gullible people are connected to truth in a way that many 
epistemologists regard as defective. Gullible people tend to form beliefs 
on the basis of factors that have no stable connection to truth. Even 
many of their true beliefs tend not to be beliefs one would have only if 
they were true; even if they are in fact true, they could all too easily have 
been false.23 This kind of connection to truth seems to be too unstable to 
make the true beliefs in question count as knowledge. A similar indirect 
connection to truth underpins the theoretical role of many other 
concepts in epistemology. So, it seems legitimate to defend or dispute 
assigning or withholding some concept a theoretical role in 
epistemology on the basis of whether it bears some important connection 
to truth.24 
                                                     
22 I mean ‘only because’ to state a necessary constitutive condition which may not be 
sufficient.  
23 That is, a gullible person's beliefs tend to fail the ‘safety’ condition on knowledge 
advocated in Sosa (1999). Even Elgin (2008), in a discussion otherwise aimed against a 
supposed hegemony of truth in epistemology, argues that TRUSTWORTHINESS bears just 
this kind of indirect but important counterfactual connections to truth.  
24 I have not said or implied that the epistemic status of a belief is some direct function of 
its truth or that having true beliefs is the most important epistemic challenge or aim, let 
alone the only fundamental one. I can happily allow that not all epistemic challenges 
concern truth or even knowledge. Even in relation to truth, the challenges of avoiding false 
beliefs, avoiding beliefs that could all too easily have been false, and so on, are distinct 
from, but no less important than, the challenge of having true beliefs, but may require 
different strategies. And clearly the full epistemic status of a belief is only an indirect and 
partial function of its truth. I also haven't said that the relevant connection to truth is 
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Many debates in epistemology are further evidence for this claim. 
Coherence theories of epistemic justification are often criticized on 
the grounds that coherence isn’t truth indicative: a set of beliefs could 
be highly coherent even if most of them were false or their coherence 
and truth were only accidentally connected. Basically the same 
objection is sometimes raised against internalist theories of knowledge 
or epistemic justification: the fact that a belief has a certain 
internalistic feature is only accidentally connected to truth and so isn’t 
a good indicator of truth. Also note that opponents of coherentism (or 
internalism) often agree that the lack of coherence (or the relevant 
internalistic feature) can weaken or defeat epistemic justification, 
precisely when beliefs which lack the feature in question are to that 
extent less likely to be true. Many other debates seem to replicate 
basically the same structure. 
It seems clear that if a particular concept bears some important 
connection to truth, it does so independently of whether it is thick or 
thin. So there is no difference in this respect between thick and thin 
epistemic concepts which could make a substantive epistemological 
difference.25 The range of thick concepts which bear an important 
connection to truth also seems wide enough to rule out any systematic 
theoretical priority of thick concepts over the thin. The natural objection 
is that these concepts might yet differ systematically in some other 
respect that is important to epistemology. I can offer two points to 
preempt this objection.  
Firstly, thick epistemic concepts which make a difference to 
epistemology independently of their connections to truth or such 
paradigmatically thin notions as knowledge seem too few to establish 
that thick concepts enjoy systematic theoretical priority over the thin. 
                                                                                                                       
promoting true belief (so that, e.g., the importance of avoiding being gullible is that this 
promotes true belief). I only require some important connection to truth.  
25 Although many thin epistemic concepts seem to be partly defined in terms of truth 
whereas most thick ones have only some less direct connection to truth, this difference 
seems insufficiently systematic or categorical to show that the distinction as such makes a 
substantive and significant difference to epistemology. 
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Many theories of knowledge incorporate various other epistemic notions 
that are often cited as thick in the literature. Some hold that the concept 
of knowledge is used to flag trustworthy informants (Craig 1991). Others 
hold that it is reasonable or appropriate to rely on a proposition p as a 
premise in practical reasoning and act on its basis only if one knows that 
p (Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005). Many hold that a belief which might 
easily have been false doesn’t count as knowledge, so that knowledge 
requires basing one’s beliefs on stable and safe reasons. But if one’s 
beliefs regarding some phenomenon are of this kind, then typically one 
appreciates explanatory connections regarding it in a way that at least 
partly constitutes understanding. I see nothing in these connections to 
suggest that the thick epistemic notions in question would be 
theoretically prior to knowledge. What they do suggest is that many 
contemporary epistemologists already do incorporate various thick 
epistemic notions in their theories. 
Secondly, the claim that thick epistemic concepts don’t enjoy 
systematic priority over the thin fits the structure of epistemological 
theories better than the claim that they do. For instance, many theories 
of knowledge attempt to analyze knowledge in terms of belief, truth, plus 
further, epistemic conditions, such as justification or warrant (and, often, 
some ‘fourth condition’ to handle Gettier cases). No such theory will tell 
us which beliefs count as knowledge until supplemented with a further 
substantive theory of the conditions in virtue of which a belief is 
epistemically justified or warranted when it is. Issues at stake include: 
whether or not these conditions comprise only factors which indicate 
truth and also are ‘internal’ in some sense; what the more specific such 
factors are, such as whether the belief is proportioned to evidence, or 
coheres with one’s other beliefs, or was formed responsibly or reliably, or 
what have you; and so on. Many of these issues at stake between these 
substantive theories are formulated in terms that are thicker than 
406 Pekka Väyrynen 
notions of justification, warrant, or knowledge.26 But nothing in this 
theoretical structure shows that thick epistemic concepts enjoy systematic 
theoretical priority over the thin.  
A comparison with the case of ethics may, in this case, prove 
illuminating. Theories of moral rightness attempt to specify the 
conditions under which an action is morally right: maximizing the good, 
treating no one as a mere means, violating no stringent rights, being 
what a virtuous person would do, and whatnot. These different 
substantive theories are structurally on a par, in that none of them will 
tell us which actions are morally right until supplemented with a 
substantive account of their central notion: what the good is, what it is to 
treat someone as a mere means, what it is to violate a stringent right, 
what a virtuous person is, or whatnot.27 Such accounts are typically 
formulated in terms of thicker ethical notions.  
But a thick ethical concept seems to play this theoretical role only 
when its role can be characterized partly in thinner terms, in a way that 
locates and structures the relevance of the thick concept in the ethical 
domain.28 For instance, even if WELL-BEING is a thick value concept, it 
plays an important role in ethical theory not only insofar as 
considerations of well-being are legitimately invoked in ethical 
assessment, have some connection to motivation, and so on, but also only 
insofar as they are relevant to what is right or good. Otherwise WELL-
BEING would seem to belong together with CHIVALRY and CHASTITY in 
the theoretical scrap heap.  
In the epistemic case, a similar line seems plausible. Thicker concepts 
like INTELLECTUAL CAUTION and GULLIBILITY seem to play an important 
theoretical role in epistemology only insofar as they are legitimately 
invoked in epistemic assessment and have some connection, however 
                                                     
26 It would, however, be worth exploring when accounting for a thin epistemic notion in 
terms of a thicker one succeeds because of the latter's thickness. 
27 For this point about the structure of moral theories, see especially Hursthouse (1996).  
28 This should seem especially reasonable if there is anything to the idea that value 
concepts get their content at least partly from the role they play in (some idealized version 
of) ethical thought. See Jackson (1998: Ch. 4). 
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indirect, to considerations of rationality, justification, or knowledge. 
Circumstances in which no such actual connection exists are easy to 
imagine. If, for instance, we inhabited a highly uniform world, then 
whether one were intellectually cautious or drew hasty generalizations 
wouldn’t affect the actual reliability of one’s beliefs. Neither one’s way of 
selecting the samples from which one generalizes nor their size would 
have such an effect. Similarly, if we inhabited a world of compulsive truth 
tellers, gullibility would have no effect on the actual reliability of our 
beliefs. Given just the actual facts about these worlds, intellectual caution 
and gullibility have no effect on the epistemic status of one’s beliefs. 
They can count as epistemic defects in these sorts of worlds only insofar 
as epistemic assessment doesn’t depend solely on facts about the actual 
world but has also some kind of counterfactual dimension.  
But note that the relevant counterfactual dimension, and thus the 
epistemic defect involved in gullibility or lack of caution, is usually 
analyzed partly in thin epistemic terms. Some theorists say that these 
beliefs aren’t robustly reliable because they would no longer have been 
reliable had the world been different even in fairly minor ways; others, 
that they fail to count as knowledge because they were formed without 
ruling out certain relevant alternatives which were epistemically possible 
to the agent; and so on.29 If the theoretical role of many thick epistemic 
concepts in epistemology is best characterized partly in thin terms, then 
we have no reason to think that thick epistemic concepts enjoy any 
systematic theoretical priority over the thin. (It doesn’t follow that thin 
concepts enjoy any systematic theoretical priority over the thick. It could 
be that there is no general priority either way. This would still allow for 
local priorities between individual thick and thin notions in either 
direction.) 
                                                     
29 As in the ethical case, these characterizations locate and structure the relevance of a 
thick notion in the epistemic domain. For instance, they can be helpful in articulating and 
explaining sources of defeat: reasons why something may fail to possess the kind of general 
positive epistemic status which is expressed by such thin epistemic concepts as RELIABILITY 
or JUSTIFICATION.  
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I conclude that if a distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts as such makes a significant difference to epistemology, this isn’t 
because thick concepts enjoy some systematic theoretical priority over 
the thin. The cumulative force of the challenges I have sought to raise 
for this hypothesis is that it is difficult to see on what other substantive 
epistemological grounds the distinction as such could plausibly be held 
to have importance to epistemology, beyond the possibility (which I can 
happily allow) that some individual thick epistemic notions turn out to 
have been insufficiently appreciated in substantive epistemological 
theory.30 Of course, for all I have said, such grounds may yet exist. But 
finding them remains a challenge to the advocates of a greater focus on 
thick epistemic concepts. The case has yet to be made for anything that 
could truthfully be advertised as a radical turn to thicker epistemology.31  
5. Conclusion 
The general position defended in this paper could perhaps be thought 
of as slim epistemology with a thick skin or exterior. But I suspect that 
many contemporary epistemological theories may already be thick 
enough that it would be unsound to charge them with neglecting thick 
epistemic concepts in favor of the thin in some way that is distorting or 
too narrow.32 In conclusion, I wish briefly to address this charge against 
contemporary epistemology.  
                                                     
30 Note that everything that I have said allows that thick epistemic concepts raise theoretically 
important issues in substantive epistemology. For instance, the issue whether thick epistemic 
concepts can be informatively decomposed into thin epistemic and purely non-epistemic 
components need be no less relevant to the prospects for virtue epistemology or expressivist 
treatments of epistemic discourse, and can be given their full due, even if a distinction between 
thick and thin epistemic concepts as such makes no significant difference to epistemology. 
31 I applaud Elgin (2008) for recognizing that such a case must be made within substantive 
epistemology. Still, I think her paper fails to expose any deep gap in mainstream 
epistemology. My case for this is largely implicit in my discussion in this section. But this 
isn't the occasion to present an explicit account of those reasons.  
32 Williams (1985) is the locus classicus of this charge in the case of contemporary ethical 
theories. My argument against the parallel charge I describe in the text against 
contemporary epistemological theories is parallel to the argument against Williams's 
charge concerning ethics in Scheffler (1987: 417).  
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We saw earlier that the distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts is a matter of degree rather than binary and that many 
epistemic concepts seem to fall somewhere between such typical 
examples of thick and thin epistemic concepts as GULLIBILITY and 
INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY, and JUSTIFICATION and KNOWLEDGE, 
respectively. Consider, just as a sample selection, BASING, PROPORTIONED 
TO EVIDENCE, SELF-EVIDENCE, INDUCTIVE SUPPORT, SAFETY, RELIABILITY, 
COHERENCE, EPISTEMIC LUCK, and EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY. Are the 
concepts on this list thick or thin?  
If these concepts are thick, then contemporary epistemology is far 
more concerned with thick epistemic concepts than the wholesale charge 
against contemporary epistemology allows. After all, many contemporary 
theories are built around concepts on this list. But if these concepts are 
thin, then the class of thin epistemic concepts is far more rich and 
diverse than the typical examples of such concepts suggest and it is far 
from clear that focusing on thin concepts distorts or oversimplifies. After 
all, the concepts on this list are familiar currency in ordinary epistemic 
discourse. And if some of the concepts on the list are thick while the 
others are thin, that gives some support to each horn of this dilemma for 
the charge that contemporary epistemology neglects thick epistemic 
concepts over the thin  
It is a complicated issue whether the list of concepts which could be 
compiled to show that contemporary epistemology is more rich and 
diverse than some people claim would supply enough richness and 
diversity. That depends, among other things, on what substantive 
connections obtain between the notions which figure on the list and the 
notions which don’t. It would be premature to make any general 
pronouncement on these issues here.  
But even if such a list of concepts still lacked enough richness and 
diversity, this would only establish the piecemeal result that certain 
individual thick epistemic concepts have greater theoretical importance 
than has previously been appreciated. It wouldn’t show that the 
distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts as such has the 
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sort of theoretical importance which could truthfully be advertised as 
supporting a radical turn to thicker epistemology. Thus, far from 
checking myself in for rehab with Anorexic Epistemologists Anonymous, 
I remain yet to be convinced that systematically favoring thick epistemic 
concepts over the thin would lead to a desirable change in 
epistemology.33  
University of Leeds 
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